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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






RUSSELL TINSLEY,  
and on behalf of residents at STU in similar situation problems, et, 




 MERRILL MAIN, PH.D, STU Clinical Director; SHERRY YATES, Department of 
Corrections; ADMINISTRATOR SHANTAY BRAIM ADAMS, Unit Manager; R. VAN 
PELT, Program Coordinator; JACQUELYN OTTINO, Program Coordinator;  
LASHONDA BURLEY, PSY.D; CHRISTOPHER BEAUMOUNT, PH.D; YANERIS 
CORNIEL, Program Coordinator; J. DMOWSKI, LCADC Clinical Psychologist 1; 
LCSW KIMBERLY STOKES; MD DEAN DE CRISCE; JO ASTRID GLADING, 
Office of the Public Defender; MARK SINGER, Senior Deputy Attorney General 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-07319) 
District Judge:  Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect, 
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 24, 2021 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 










 Appellant Russell Tinsley brought a civil rights complaint against several New 
Jersey officials based on his civil commitment in a state sex offender treatment program.  
The District Court dismissed most of the claims and granted judgment to the defendants 
on the remainder.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.  
 Tinsley alleged in his operative amended complaint that he was civilly committed1 
to the New Jersey Department of Corrections Special Treatment Unit in May 2010.2  He 
stated that he had been progressing through the treatment program until 2014, when he 
was supposed to move to Phase 2.  Certain psychologists allegedly recommended that he 
repeat portions of the Phase 1 program rather than advance to the next treatment phase.  
Tinsley filed several grievances against the psychologists and alleged that they and the 
clinical director retaliated against him for filing the grievances by prolonging his 
treatment.  Later, Tinsley was told not to publish a book that he had written while in 
treatment because it included the names of the victims of Tinsley’s crimes (who were 
minors), and Tinsley was placed on treatment probation after he nevertheless published.  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Tinsley is committed under the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 30:4-27.24 et seq., which provides for the custody, care, and treatment of 
involuntarily committed persons who are deemed to be sexually violent predators.     
2 Because we write mainly for the benefit of the parties, we recount only those facts that 




The complaint then listed several general allegations about the conditions in the Special 
Treatment Unit, including that the unit is understaffed and the residents are often denied 
phone calls, showers, and treatment.  Tinsley’s complaint appears to allege four claims 
against the various defendants: (1) violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
adequate treatment; (2) violations of his First Amendment rights in connection with the 
publication of his book; (3) violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
regarding retaliation for filing grievances; and (4) violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ proscription on cruel and unusual punishment.  
 The District Court first granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss but allowed 
Tinsley to file an amended complaint.  After Tinsley did so, the Court again dismissed all 
claims except the First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Christopher 
Beaumont, Merrill Main, and R. Van Pelt.3  After allowing discovery to proceed, the 
Court, in three opinions, granted the remaining defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment.  This timely pro se appeal followed.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s rulings.4  See Tundo v. Cnty. of Passaic, 923 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 
 
3 The claims against Sherry Yates and Jo Astrid Glading also survived because they did 
not move to dismiss.  
4 Tinsley’s notice of appeal was received by the District Clerk on September 9, 2020, 
more than 30 days after the District Court’s July 31, 2020 summary judgment order.  See 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (requiring an appeal in a civil case to be filed within 30 days 
of the order appealed from).  However, the notice of appeal was dated August 6, 2020, 
and was thus timely because Tinsley is civilly committed.  See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 
266, 276 (1988) (discussing the prison-mailbox rule); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926-




2019); Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).  To state 
a claim, a civil complaint must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that its claims 
are facially plausible.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  Summary 
judgment is then appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  
See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 The District Court rightly dismissed Tinsley’s Fourteenth Amendment claims 
based on the allegedly inadequate treatment he was receiving.  His allegations amount to 
a challenge to the defendants’ refusal to advance him to the next phase of treatment, 
thereby preventing him from advancing further toward being released.5  New Jersey’s 
statutory scheme for the civil commitment and treatment of sex offenders creates a due 
process liberty interest in that treatment.  Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 
2002).  We must ask whether the officials acted with deliberate indifference with respect 
 
though the District Court originally inadvertently failed to dismiss the claims against Jo 
Astrid Glading, it later corrected that error after Tinsley filed his notice of appeal.  See 
ECF 237.  To the extent that Tinsley’s notice of appeal was premature, that correction 
allowed the notice of appeal to ripen.  See Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 
179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a premature notice of appeal, filed after 
disposition of some of the claims before a district court, but before entry of final 
judgment, will ripen upon the court’s disposal of the remaining claims). 
5 To the extent that Tinsley was seeking to be released from confinement, such relief can 
only be granted through a habeas corpus petition.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
475, 500 (1973); see also Souder v. McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting 




to Tinsley’s treatment and deprived him of his liberty interest in a way that shocks the 
conscience.  Id. at 546-47.  Here, Tinsley had not alleged that he was denied treatment or 
otherwise identified any specific faults with the treatment he is receiving.  We do not 
discern any behavior from the complaint that is “so egregious, so outrageous” as to state a 
claim.  See id. at 547 (quotation marks omitted).  
 Tinsley’s assertions that he and others in the Special Treatment Unit are subject to 
“inhumane conditions” likewise fails to state a claim.  Because Tinsley is civilly 
committed and is not confined by way of a criminal conviction, his conditions-of-
confinement claim is analyzed under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325 (1982); Smego v. Mitchell, 
723 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013).  Under the Due Process Clause, “whether respondent’s 
constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty 
interests against the relevant state interests.”  See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321.  Tinsley 
complained that the institution is sometimes subject to lockdowns that limit his access to 
phone calls, treatment, and showers.  However, he has not quantified or elaborated upon 
those alleged deprivations, and his general allegations simply cannot overcome the 
“presumption of correctness” that is afforded to the decisions made by the defendants in 
this case.  See id. at 324 (“Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions of this 
type—often, unfortunately, overcrowded and understaffed—to continue to function.”).         
  Finally, Tinsley alleged that the defendants retaliated against him in violation of 
the First Amendment by refusing to advance his treatment after he filed grievances 




Amendment retaliation claim, an individual must assert that: (1) he engaged in 
constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a 
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the 
constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse 
action.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  In this context, “a prima facie 
showing of causation requires more than the allegation that the professional based a 
medical decision on symptomology that happened to relate in some way to a patient’s 
protected activity.  There must be particular facts alleged that allow the court to 
reasonably infer it is the protected activity itself, and not simply medically relevant 
behavior associated with that activity, that formed the basis of the defendant’s adverse 
action.”  Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 2017).  If Tinsley makes his prima 
facie case, the “burden shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it ‘would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for 
reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.’”  Id. at 190 (quoting 
Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334).  
We agree with the District Court’s careful analysis of these claims.  As to 
Tinsley’s claim concerning his book, the evidence shows that the defendants placed him 
on restricted status because of the effect his book was having on his treatment; there is no 
evidence that the defendants were targeting Tinsley’s constitutionally protected conduct 




As to Tinsley’s claim concerning his grievances, we agree with the District Court 
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and defendant Main6 is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law as to his defense that he would have made the same decision 
to recommend against advancing Tinsley to the next treatment level regardless of whether 
Tinsley had filed grievances.  A detailed annual report from 2019 notes, among other 
things, that Tinsley is often “preoccupied with attempts to convince others of his 
presentation of being a person who has been unfairly persecuted by the legal system,” 
that he minimizes the sexual crimes he committed against adolescents, and that he was 
recently placed on a restricted status for “poor control of his anger, impulsivity, being 
verbally abusive and threatening, and severely disrupting the therapeutic milieu.”  See 
ECF 222-2 at 13-15.  According to the report, the publication of the book was only 
further evidence of “poor judgment and an inflated sense of self-importance.”  ECF 222-2 
at 14.  Given the quantum of evidence that the defendants’ decisions were justified by 
Tinsley’s non-protected activity, Main was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.7  
See generally Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 
6 Tinsley also raised this claim against defendant Beaumont, but as the District Court 
explained, there was no evidence that Beaumont was aware of Tinsley’s complaints until 
after he had taken the alleged retaliatory action, and Tinsley therefore cannot show 
causation. 
7 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of Tinsley’s remaining claims, for 
essentially the reasons that the District Court provided.  See ECF No. 104.  The conflict-
of-interest claim against Stokes was not cognizable under § 1983 as it did not allege a 
violation of the Constitution or federal laws.  See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 
(3d Cir. 1996).  The retaliation, fraud, and abuse of power allegations against Stokes were 
conclusory and failed to state a claim.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  The allegations that 




 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
Tinsley’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  
 
were insufficient because the allegations, assuming they are true, amounted to an 
“isolated mishap” rather than a “pattern of attacks.”  See Shaw ex rel. Strain v. 
Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1143 (3rd Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted).  The 
District Court was correct that Deputy Attorney General Singer did not violate Tinsley’s 
constitutional rights by failing to respond to a grievance.  See generally Massey v. 
Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance 
procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner.”).  Tinsley’s allegations that Corniel 
required him to repeat some modules and “brushed off evidence” of his completion of 
other modules was not “so egregious, so outrageous that it may fairly be said to shock the 
contemporary conscience.”  Leamer, 288 F.3d at 547 (quotation marks omitted). 
